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Abstract
Faced with the likely prospect of steadily declining defense
budgets President Bush initiated the Defense Management Review
(DMR). In response to this review, DOD agencies identified $38B in
cost savings initiatives. This thesis provides the reader with a
comprehensive analysis of those transportation-related initiatives
addressed by specific Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRD) as
well as those that indirectly emanated from the general DMR
process. Also included is an introduction to the complicated issue
of transportation funding which covers both the Defense Business
Operations Fund (DBOF) and unit costing. Finally, the author
discusses the current funding shortfall that the Air Mobility
Command (AMC) is experiencing as a result of the reduction in
military transportation budgets. The author concludes with a
summary of the discussed issues, highlighting the strengths and
weaknesses of each.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since peaking as a percentage of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in 1985, the defense budget has consumed a
decreasing portion of our economy. This gradual reduction in
spending has our country investing the lowest levels in
defense in over thirty years. Careful planning by defense
experts is required to avoid the historical pitfalls that have
plagued our country during military downsizing. Inappropriate
decisions during this relative lull in world unrest can result
in unnecessary and costly recovery in future years.
As the services shrink, the requirement for a more mobile
military becomes imperative. A smaller force structure will
require the ability to rapidly concentrate the available
resources more quickly than in the past. This issue is being
addressed by the various services through each of the service
transportation commands. The Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC) is operated by the Army and is concerned with
the land transportation and terminal needs of the military.
The Navy's defense transportation mission is performed by the
Military Sealift Command (MSC). In this role, MSC is
responsible for the heavy sealift of supplies and materials.
The Air Mobility Command (AMC) is under the auspices of the
Air Force and is responsible for the air shipment mode of the
DOD transportation system. These transportation managers,
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along with the logistic support in•-astracture, must actively
seek to find better and more cost efficient methods to
successfu-iy meet their established objectives. This thesis
will review some currently pending issues and alternatives
which are being considered by DOD policy makers.
Long before the demise of the Soviet Union, the executive
branch anticipated the need to reduce what was perceived as a
burgeoning defense support structure. In a proactive move
early in his administration, President Bush initiated a
program to review and identify these inefficiencies. His
program was dubbed the Defer Management Review (DMR) and was
designed to task the iious DOD activities with the
responsibility of identifying $30B in department-wide savings.
The response to this challenge was thirty eight Defense
Management Review Decisions (DMRD) with a total identified
savings of over $38B. Chapter II of this thesis addresses the
four DMRDs that affect the DOD transportation system and
focuses on one that is primarily concerned with
transportation. Also included is a discussion on
transportation funding and the development of the Defense
Business Operations Fund (DBOF).
Chapter III is a review of the Defense Logistic Agency's
(DLA) proposal for a two tier pricing system. The discussion
includes a review of the DOD comptroller's unit costing
theory. This discussion includes an economic analysis of the
foundations on which unit costing is based, as well as a
2
review of what DLA views as its advantages. It also reviews
the current Uniform Material Movement Issue Priority System
(UMMIPS), including the newly implemented modifications that
separate the issue priority from the shipping priority. This
analysis is of particular interest since its implementation
adds a great deal of flexibility to the transportation cost
reduction program. Finally, the discussed plans and proposals
are presented to various DOD experts who review and comment on
their potential for actual implementation.
The fourth chapter delves into the subject of organic
military air transportation. After discussing an AMC
practical experiment concerning cargo holding time, the
chapter examines the options available to the AMC in
reconciling competing variables. The chapter continues by
examining the currently pending UMMIPS timeframe changes,
including both a DOD and Air Force proposal. Finally, an Air
Force commissioned study is examined. The study was conducted
by a defense related think-tank to assess the validity of the
Air Force's practical experiment.
The final chapter summarizes the various initiatives
currently being considered by DOD.
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II. TRANSPORTATION COST REDUCTIONS RESULTING FROM THE DMR
A. BACKGROUND
Shortly after his inauguration in January of 1989,
President Bush announced that a comprehensive review would be
conducted in the Department of Defense to identify economies
and efficiencies which could be achieved. This led to the July
1989 Defense Management Review (DMR) sponsored by the
Secretary of Defense. The DMR proposed six (6) broad
objectives:
"* To reduce overhead in DOD while maintaining military
strength.
"* To improve weapon systems performance.
"* To revitalize the department's Planning Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS).
"* To reduce micro management.
"* To strengthen the industrial base for defense initiatives
in American industry.
"* To improve observances of ethical standards in government
and industry.
The major goal of these objectives was to identify savings
totaling $30 billion that would offset cuts already
implemented for the period FY 91-95.
As the Chief Executive, President Bush's effort to contain
costs was visionary in light of the recent demise of the then
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. The shift in public opinion
4
that has occurred since these world events has intensified the
requirement for the "support side" of DOD to trim costs in
order to minimize the effects that force structure or
readiness might otherwise absorb.
1. DOD Transportation Funding Overview
The increases in the late 1980s in DOD transportation
costs can be traced to the spiraling industria± fund rates.
Increases in these rates were driven by the reliance upon
commercial carriers, particularly ocean carriers. Federal law
requires that no more than 50% of DOD cargo be moved on MSC
ships. The remaining cargo must move on a United States flag
carrier at market prices. The increased ocean transportation
costs were the market reaction to the then burgeoning export
trade of the United States resulting from the weakening
dollar. [Ref. l:p. 3-1l
The DOD funding for transportation was $8.8B in FY-88.
This total was divided into two main object classes:
passenger, $4B, and cargo transportation, $4.8B. Cargo
transportation was further divided into the two main
categories: household goods, $1.4B, and freight, $3.4B. The
focus of this discussion will be on the two major freight
transportation accounts: first destination transportation,
$168.3M, and second destination transportation, $1.58B.
First destination transportation costs are those
incurred when transporting newly procured supplies and
5
equipment from the vendor to the initial storage site. The
larger account, second destination charges, is to pay for
costs incurred for moving the material from the storage site
to its final destination. These second destination
transportation costs are where the majority of the $179M
increase in transportation costs fell in FY-89. The majority
of costs incurred due to these second destination costs are
for movemant of military supplies and equipment (Fig. 1-1).
[Ref. 1:p. 1-1 - 1-21
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6
2. Defense Business Operation Fund/Transportation
(DBOF/T)
The Defense Business Operation Fund / Transportation
(DBOF/T) is the portion of DBOF that is designed to support
servicewide transportation costs. The AMC DBOF/T subaccount
is a revolving fund designed to support all of the operating
costs of AMC. The level of money in the subaccount at any
given time is a function of revenues and expenditures. The
majority of AMC's expenditures are of a variable nature such
as fuel and civilian-contracted air services. AMC DBOF/T
subaccount revenues primarily come from cargo airlift revenues
and training appropriations.
Under the original rules, AMC was to develop rates
based on the next year's projected budgets and workload. Each
year the rates would be revised with the reconciliation of any
surplus/deficit of funds from the previous year being included
in the new rates. In an effort to avoid penalizing their
customers for utilizing government services, OSD (P&L) decided
that it would be better to require AMC to match the current
commercial shipping rate. AMC budget planners now establish
annual AMC rates for cargo airlift commensurate with
commercial services. Since the annually established rate is
susceptible to extraneous pressures, such as fluctuating fuel
and maintenance costs, cargo revenues will routinely differ
from costs. To compensate for these fluctuations in revenues,
7
all funding differences will be reconciled through
supplemental OSD funding.
Another deviation from the original DBOF concept is
that AMC receives a direct reimbursement for all military pay
costs incurred by AMC. Under the original DBOF concept, all
costs incurred by an organization were to be reflected in the
cost of the goods or services provided. This is particularly
interesting considering that military pay is about 30% of the
total costs incurred by AMC.
Prior to the Defense Business Operation Fund (DBOF),
each mode of the military transportation system had its own
industrial fund account. These accounts received annual
funding to cover the costs of operations and were to be
reimbursed based on a SECDEF established rate. These rates
were established over a year in advance of the applicable
fiscal year, and tended to fluctuate wildly while trying to
compensate for actual expenses. In 1990 all of the
transportation industrial funds were combined and are now
collectively known as the Defense Business Operation Fund /
Transportation (DBOF/T).
B. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW DECISIONS (DXRD)
The result of the Defense Management Review was a list of
thirty eight Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRD).
These DMRDs projected a total savings of $39B. The Navy's
share was $11.9B. [Ref. 2:p. 61
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Of these thirty eight DMRDs, three have some impact on the
Defense Transportation System and one is completely focused on
transportation cost reductions. With the exception of DMRD
915, the focus of these directives is in areas other than pure
transportation matters, but as the following discussion will
support, they are certainly worthy of consideration in this
analysis of transportation costs.
DMRDs with transportation implications are the following:
0 DMRD 901 - Reducing supply system costs.
9 DMRD 902 - Depot consolidation.
0 DMRD 926 - Inventory control point consolidation.
0 DMRD 915 - Reducing transportation costs.
1. DMRD 901
DMRD 901, "Reducing Supply Systems Costs," has the
largest impact in terms of infrastructure and cost savings
potential. The major point of this directive is to allow the
universal visibility of Inventory Control Point (ICP), stock
point and retail assets to the inventory manager in order to
reduce physical distribution expenses. The visibility of these
assets will allow defense item managers to direct the issue of
needed material to the customer from the geographically
closest storage location thereby minimizing transportation
costs. Opposition to this policy exists in some of the
services because it is felt that they will have less control
over what they feel are strategically located assets. This
9
argument has increasingly less credence considering the
present world political situation and should be disregarded.
[Ref. 3:p. 8-91
Another recommendation by the Undersecretary of
Defense is the positioning of Ready For Issue (RFI) material
and stockpiling of repairable components awaiting induction
into a repair facility (Non-RFI components) in more economical
locations. Current policy for material location has each
local supply point establishing parts inventory and safety
levels to support forecasted demand and centrally storing NRFI
turn-ins awaiting overhaul in Norfolk or San Diego. By
eliminating double handling of parts and storing NRFI
carcasses closest to the designated overhaul point,
significant savings in both transportation and inventory
management costs are possible. Additionally, improving the
information and communication systems between wholesale
activities and customers has reduced the requirement for
intermediate inventories at local supply points.
These administrative improvements reduce the need to
stage large intermediate quantities at local supply
distribution points by reducing the ICP leadtime. This
reduction in leadtime will significantly reduce second
destination transportation and inventory holding costs
incurred by intermediate inventory holders. Now, the
requirement can often be shipped directly from the
manufacturer or wholesale stock point. Finally, with improved
10
forecasting, more effective inventory levels can be
established for deploying units consolidating many repair
parts aboard combat logistic ships and storage facilities
ashore. [Ref. 3:p. 9]
2. DMRD 902
DMRD 902, "Consolidation of Defense Supply Depots,"
directed DLA to assume all defense material distribution
functions currently conducted by the Department of Defense
supply depots. It also approved a pilot plan to consolidate
interservice material distribution operations in the San
Francisco Bay Area in order to test the hypothesis that
economies of scale are possible. This test included
evaluating a new software system that interfaced with the
various service systems, assessing the impact on customer
service, and developing future consolidation strategies.
[Ref. 4:p. 10]
A key part of the prototype effort is to determine the
systems support required to optimize the opportunities for
consolidation and streamlining material distribution
functions. The result of these efforts has been named the
Defense Distribution System (DDS). This standardized system
is made up of the DLA Warehousing and Shipping Procedures
(DWASP), the Air Force Stock Control and Distribution (SC & D)
System and the Navy's Integrated Storage and Retrieval System
(NISTARS).
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Shipping will be supported through DWASP automated
shipping and transportation functions, including shipment
planning, transportation unit consolidation, rating, routing,
carrier selection, GBL preparation, small parcel costing, mode
selection and manifesting. The anticipated savings from these
initiatives are due to the economies expected from
standardizing the defense material distribution functions and
systems.
Some senior Navy leaders feel that implementing DDS is
a prudent decision but differ on who should actually perform
the local supply depot function. These leaders think that if
DLA runs the organization a serious void will occur in
customer service unless the Navy has their own hierarchy to
perform that function. It is argued that this duplicity of
command will nullify any cost savings attributed to
consolidation. [Ref. 4:p. 101
The author's experience has been that service organic
customer support is transparent from the depots. The primary
functions of receiving, stowing, issuing and transporting
requirements could ea3ily be assumed by DLA with few adverse
effects.
3. DMRD 926
DMRD 926, "Consolidation of Inventory Control Points,
calls for two major changes: 1) the transfer of approximately
1.4 million consumable items from the services to DLA and 2)
12
the reduction by consolidation of the 20 DOD inventory control
points.
With regard to the consumable transfer, DMRD 926
proposed a material migration of historic proportions. The
services wquld be required to transfer custody of about one
million consumable parts to the Defense Logistic Agency.
Services were allowed to maintain custody of specialized
consumables in view of the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) own
1985 Weapon Systems Management Objectives, but the vast
majority of consumables are now to be maintained by DLA.
DMRD 926 also calls for consolidating the 20
DLA/service controlled inventory control points. The options
offered by DOD included:
"* Each service consolidates its own ICPs
"* DLA take over all ICPs
"* Organize ICPs by service by commodity
After a great deal of discussion, DOD and the services
agreed that each would consolidate its own ICPs. Everyone
considered the other two options to run counter to the
SECDEF's 1985 Weapon System Management Objectives.
[Ref. 5:p. 22]
Physically transferring consumable inventories to DLA
activities is a double-edged sword. The transportation costs
associated with transferring consumable material to the DLA
activity consolidation point is an additional expense that
will take some time to recover. On the other hand,
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substantial savings are possible through reduced manpower at
the depots to manage these consumable items. Additionally, by
shipping the customer requests directly from the wholesale
level to the customer, the second destination transportation
costs (depot to customer) are eliminated.
Consolidating the Defense Logistic Agency and service
inventory control points offers the most promise for cost
savings in DMRD 926. The services' reluctance to move to all
DLA managed inventory control points is parochial. The impact
of the ICP is completely transparent to the customer. Because
this part of the consolidation is more concerned with
eliminating parallel management structures than with
relocating material, significant economies of scale are
possible.
4. DMRD 915
DMRD 915, "Reducing Transportation Costs," undoubtedly
has the largest impact on cost reductions in the
transportation field. As highlighted in the executive summary
of DMRD 915, DOD has recently experienced a $179M increase in
transportation costs. This increase has aggravated budget
shortfalls which threaten to degrade readiness and
sustainability either through delaying shipments or diverting
funds from other accounts.
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The Navy has identified, and in some cases expanded,
the following DMRD 915 initiatives to help achieve the savings
mandated by the DMR:
1. Guaranteed traffic program
2. Prepayment auditing
3. Air challenge program
4. Electronic data interchange and electronic funds
transfer
5. Carrier qualification/performance programs
6. Regional freight consolidation centers
7. Transportation protection services
8. Consolidate small package shipments
9. Manage/control UMMIPS
10. Direct shipments from vendors
11. Maximize use of organic cargo airlift
12. Improve intransit visibility
The three to five year time line that exists for fully
implementing the listed programs leaves DOD with three options
in the short term: 1) increase transportation funding, 2)
reduce programs, or 3) divert shipments to less expensive
modes. As a result of defense budget cuts and the $179M
increase in second destination costs, the services will




Initiatives one through six above are ongoing
efforts that can yield significant cost reductions if expanded
or given higher level DOD support. Each will be briefly
summarized emphasizing their future potential for additional
savings.
(1) Guaranteed Traffic Program. Launched in 1979,
the guaranteed traffic program involves awarding a single
carrier long term large traffic volumes between specific
shipping and receiving activities. In spite of the over $300M
saved since its implementation, the only DOD agency to fully
embrace it has been DLA. By increasing the services'
participation, DOD anticipates savings of over $30 million
annually. [Ref. 1:p. 2-1]
(2) Prepayment Auditing Program. In 1986, Public
Law 99-627 gave GSA the right to delegate prepayment auditing
authority to DOD. GSA responded by giving DOD limited
delegation of prepayment authority for international household
goods bills at the United States Army Finance and Accounting
Center. The prepayment auditing of those bills has saved the
government over $2 million through 1988. DOD planners
received full prepayment auditing authority in July 1988 and
expect annual savings to exceed $40 million annually upon full
implementation. (Ref. l:p. 2-3]
16
(3) Air Challenge Program. Instituted in 1976, the
Air Challenge Program examines individual air shipments to
determine if a less costly mode of transportation is
appropriate. This review of shipments designated by the
Uniform Material Management Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) as
air eligible results in over $117M in annual savings.
[Ref. l:p. 2-4]
(4) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) Program. These technologies
are being tested or applied throughout DOD. EDI facilitates
exchanging standard business documents via electronic means,
usually a wide area network. EFT accommodates a similar
transfer but for payments and remittance advice information.
DOD estimates that $10M to $17M in savings are possible after
fully implementing this technology. [Ref. l:p. 2-51
(5) Carrier Qualification and Performance Program.
This program was implemented in the mid 80's by the Military
Traffic Management Command (MTMC) in response to the other-
than-optimal service they were receiving from some carriers.
The deregulation of the trucking industry resulted in lower
rates but also opened the doors to some poorly managed
carriers. By requiring carriers to meet minimum standards,
DOD has effectively stemmed many of the losses associated with
unscrupulous or incapable contractors. Savings under this
17
program are indirect and therefore difficult for DOD to
quantify. [Ref. l:p. 2-7]
(6) Regional Freight Consolidation Centers.
Freight consolidation centers are widely used in the
transportation industry to consolidate less-than-truckload
(LTL) shipments into truckload (TL) shipments. This
consolidation generally results in dramatic cost savings and
improved services. The government historically has spent
upwards of 38% of its highway freight budget on LTL shipments
while civilian firms spend less than 10%. LTL shipments are
estimated to cost seven times more than identical shipments at
the TL rate. Fully implementing this program is expected to
result in over $60M in savings annually. [Ref. l:p. 2-8]
b. New Initiatives
The remaining six initiatives are new and show
great potential for cost saving but presently are only
planned.
(1) Transportation Protective Services (TPS).
Protective services for freight shipments are currently
estimated to cost the government about $19M a year. The bulk
of this cost goes to support escort vehicles and armed guards.
Implementing mobile satellite-based positioning and reporting
systems is thought to hold tremendous potential in limiting
these costs. This technology allows managers to monitor the
driver's location and routes from the moment he departs the
18
pickup point. Annual savings upon fully implementing this
program are expected to be between $1.6M and $2.5M.
[Ref 1:p. 2-9]
(2) Consolidate Small Package Shipments.
Consolidating small package shipments has interested DOD for
several years. Unlike LTL shipments, small package shipments
are generally high priority in naturt- and require immediate
delivery. DOD is currently preparing a small package express
contract that will award all international DOD small package
shipments to one US flag carrier. Immediate savings of $2M can
be expected for DOD's largest express shipping customer, the
Defense Mapping Agency. DOD suggests significant additional
savings can be obtained if this program is implemented
department-wide. [Ref. l:p. 2-101
(3) Manage/Control UMMIPS. DMRD 915 cited the 1989
Inspector General's report finding that almost 50% of all DOD
requisitions are inappropriately ranked as high priority items
incurring premium transportation charges. This same report
charges that requisitioners often irresponsibly boost the
issue group priority in order to circumvent the Uniform
Material Movement and Issue Priority System. During research
for this thesis, Tom Hardcastle of Logistic Management
Institute (LMI), who penned DMRD 915 for the Undersecretary of
Defense, was asked how he concluded that basing transportation
priority on both issue group and required delivery date
19
entries could correct the existing abuse of the UMMIP system.
He said he feels that by requiring requisitioners to cite a
required delivery date on an Issue Group 1 or 2 requisition of
less than twenty one days, they will more thoughtfully
consider their choice of transportation mode. [Ref. l:p. 2-111
The reasons abuses of the UMMIP system occur
are many, but for the shipboard Supply Officer two come to
mind. First, the majority of requisitions are for not carried
items ordered by shipboard customers to complete some sort of
in-process maintenance action. The Supply Officer assigns
issue group priorities based on the urgency of need expressed
by the customer. Second, regular underway periods and
fluctuating schedules complicate issue group priority
selection. Because of these factors, 75% of requisitions for
material not carried on the ship or at the local supply point
are ordered under the issue group priority 1 or 2 designation.
The breakdown of the UMMIPS time frames are transparent to the
customer and shipboard Supply Officer. If the local Supply
Depot cannot fill the requisition today, the maintenance
action can not be completed and shipboard readiness is
affected until the part arrives and the repair is made. This
decision process is supported by the NAVSUP-implemented caveat
that a maximum of 50% of all requisitions may be ordered under
the issue group one or two priority designations. The
requirement to use an RDD of less than twenty one days in the
future will alone have little effect on the conservation of
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limited high priority transportation dollars. A solution to
this problem will only occur after introducing a
transportation priority assignment system where the ordering
activity incurs the cost of premium transportation. This
theory can only be applied if unit commanders are provided
with earmarked funds for this purpose. This system will force
operational units to make hard decisions as to what is in fact
a readiness issue and what is not. A system of this type
could make the air shipment challenge program obsolete by
forcing the initiator of the requisition to financially
rationalize his decision.
(4) Direct Shipments from Vendors. Shipping
freight directly from the vendors to the final customer has
tremendous potential for reducing costs for two reasons.
First, shipping directly to the customer reduces second
destination charges, the area of the most growth in the
transportation budget. Secondly, by shipping directly from
the vendor, warehousing and inventory control costs could be
reduced. This system would be better suited for less critical
materials and parts and is not meant to replace the supply
system. [Ref. 1:p. 2-12]
(5) Maximize the Use of Organic Cargo Airlift.
Freight designated by UMMIPS as air or air eligible is shipped
via AMC as a first choice, with commercial air being used as
backup. The recent focus on the high cost of air
21
transportation has resulted in much of this cargo being
diverted to less expensive modes of surface transportation.
The result has been a false economy since excess capacity now
exists on many AMC aircraft. The "savings" that has occurred
as a result of the air challenge program is therefore
distorted. (Ref. 1:p. 2-141
Some hypothesize that if AMC utilized the RDD
vice the UMMIPS issue group priority system as a determining
factor when assigning shipments to specific flights, AMC could
more effectively manage the surges in transportation
requirements. This would decrease reliance on more expensive
commercial transportation. These individuals fail to realize
that the cost of the AMC flying hour program is a sunk cost
for DOD. There are real efficiencies to be gained by
effectively managing training and transportation requirements.
Alternatives identified by experts are based on formulas that
would charge for services based on actual usage. This type of
logic is similar to the above proposal that transportation be
funded by the demanding activity.
(6) Improve Intransit Visibility. Commercially
developing intransit visibility systems capable of tracking
over one million shipments simultaneously is a technological
breakthrough the government could utilize with a relatively
small capital investment (Ref. l:p. 2-14]. These "state of
the art" systems have numerous applications including:
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"* Improved readiness through the ability to divert critical
material in route.
"* Enhancing the regional freight and small package
consolidation systems by providing planners with the
ability to forecast requirements.
C. CONCLUSION
The root of the projected $2B transportation deficit by
FY-94 is increased second destination charges for ocean
carriers [Ref. l:p. 1-71. Overcoming market forces is beyond
the scope of DOD, especially in light of the political and
military pressures to maintain a United States liner fleet.
Solutions to overcoming these shortcomings in DOD
transportation funding lie in policy reorganization and
implementing cost-saving initiatives. Specifically, the
DBOF/T revolving fund and second destination transportation
charges have been identified as the areas in which the largest
savings can be achieved. The purpose of revolving funds are
solely to provide working capital to finance transportation
costs for DOD customers. As the DBOF implementation proceeds,
many difficulties will be encountered with these revolving
funds that will suggest modifications in their original
principles.
Second destination transportation costs require much more
ingenuity to handle. The first eight initiatives discussed
above are estimated to save over $240M a year upon full
implementation [Ref. l:p. 2-15]. This savings goes a long way
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toward offsetting the projected deficit, but more is needed.
None of the remaining three initiatives have been costed for
savings, but the UMMIP system is outdated and appears to
afford the most opportunity for transportation savings. By
putting the onus for transportation costs on the
requisitioner, the requirement for premium transportation can
be reduced. The present communal system produces no benefits
for the prudent financial manager.
With the current economic and budgetary environment, we
can only expect tighter funding constraints as Congress looks
to defense cuts to solve the federal deficit problem. World
political events are allowing us an opportunity to stand back
from our readiness-at-all costs ideals and make some cost
effective decisions; we need to make them.
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III. UNIT COSTS AND THE TWO TIER PRICING PROGRAM
A. BACKGROUND
In the years since the Defense Management Review Decision
(DMRD) 915 was published, the world has undergone an
unforeseeable metamorphosis: the Berlin Wall is gone, the
Soviet empire has collapsed and the United States has emerged
as the last remaining military superpower. However one might
view these events, one thing is certain; the Department of
Defense (DOD) will be scrutinized with regard to efficiency
like never before. As far as transportation savings are
concerned, DMRD 915 initiatives are being viewed as only the
starting point for future efficiencies and spending cuts.
A common perception throughout DOD is that excessive
transportation costs result from abusing the Uniform Material
Management Issue Priority Systems (UMMIPS). The Defense
Logistic Agency (DLA) feels that the UMMIP System has outlived
its usefulness and should be replaced by a two tier pricing
system that they say is founded upon the acting DOD
comptroller's (Mr. Donald Shycoff) unit cost theory. In order
to introduce the debate, unit costing is discussed and both
the UMMIP and two tier pricing system are described.
This chapter introduces some factors and externalities
that complicate the analysis of the various initiatives under
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consideration. Next, the various strengths of each initiative
as seen by various DOD policy makers are compared and
contrasted. Finally, conclusions based on research and
personal experience are considered.
1. Unit Costing
In 1987, Mr. Donald Shycoff, while working at DLA,
came upon the idea of "unit costing." Unit costing was
heralded as an idea whose time had come. The purpose was to
improve efficiency and productivity. In 1992, Shycoff became
the acting comptroller for the Department of Defense (DOD) and
unit costing became a DOD-wide concept. According to DLA,
unit costing is nothing more than the concept that all costs
incurred at an activity should find their way into some
measure of output [Ref. 6:p. 1]. The idea is to apply
business accounting methods to determine if an activity is
recovering their costs. Of course, DOD is not interested in
turning a profit, so the price charged per output is designed
to recover only the activity's costs. In unit costing, the
price for each output is determined prior to the beginning of
the fiscal year by dividing this year's total costs by next
year's expected output. With world events being what they
are, it goes without saying that "next year's projected
output" is only an educated guess. To compensate for these
expected fluctuations, the Defense Business Operations Fund
(DBOF) has been established. DBOF will fund service
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organizations for periods when revenues do not cover costs
with the understanding that the services will reimburse DBOF
in future years when revenues exceed costs. At first glance,
this idea seems possible, but some economists disagree with
the concept of a nonprofit organization applying business-type
accounting in order to generate efficiency.
Mr Shycoff's theory treats points on the average total
cost (ATC) curve as if they were marginal costs. His
assumption, that unit costs based on the ATC can be compared
across activities without regard to the position of the ATC,
is faulty. Though points on a marginal cost (MC) curve and on
a ATC curve are both sensitive to quantity, only marginal
costs can be compared across activities, regardless of the
quantity produced, to determine where to produce an additional
unit of output. The reason for this is that average total
costs consider both fixed and variable costs. Only variable
costs change with output. Thus, the cost of producing an
additional unit of output is measured by the change in
variable costs. Marginal costs track the incremental cost of
producing one more unit by only considering variable costs.
Unit costs based on average total cost curves can only be
compared across activities when both the position of the curve
and the quantity produced are identical.
In support of this position, economists offer the
following: First, assuming that two activities have the same
average total cost curve (same efficiency), quantity over
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which they have no control drives the cost of their service
(see Figure 3-1). Threatening to close inefficient activities
based on this premise would be incorrect and could possibly
lead to gaming.
Secondly, assume that two activities have different
average total cost curves (different efficiencies). The
quantity produced by each activity, again over which they have
little control, could lead the casual observer to assume a
firm with a higher average total cost curve was more
efficient. That firm may have a lower unit cost in spite of
having higher average costs (see Figure 3-2).
The inability to compare the unit cost of identical
outputs across competing activities leads one to question the
usefulness of unit costing. Economists draw similar
conclusions when attempting to compare average total costs and
profits across activities and conclude that without a free
market and profit motivation it is difficult for DOD to apply
a market solution. [Ref. 6:p. 71
2. Current UMMIPS situation
The UMMIP system has been in use for over twenty
years. The issue priority is based on the urgency of need as
well as the fleet activity designator. Issue group one
requisitions are assigned priorities one through three and, as
such, warrant high priority transportation, usually air.








Figure 3-2 Unit Costs Of Firms With Different ATC Curvýes
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through eight and are considered air eligible. Many inventory
levels are insulated from routine demands and can only be
accessed with an issue group one requisition. When an issue
group one requisition is cut for a requirement it is
considered to be urgent and, as such, receives both high
priority warehuse handling and premium transportation.
Currently, a flat 2.5% surcharge is accessed on all
requisitions to cover the average cost of transportation. This
value-based assessment has effectively worked in the past.
However, DOD's new unit costing initiatives are projected to
cause deficits of up to $400M in the transportation funds by
the mid 90s. [Ref. l:p. 1-6]
Often an activity will assign a requisition an Issue
Group one priority solely to penetrate protected inventory
levels. As a result of DMRD 915, the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) has implemented a method in which
requisitioners can penetrate inventory levels without
incurring premium transportation and inventory handling
charges. This change is referred to as "modified UMMIPS
procedures." Under these new procedures, the requisition
priority is assigned to a requisition as in the past but a new
link has been established between the priority and required
delivery date. A requisition may now carry an IG one
priority, but when the requisitioner puts 777 in the Required
Delivery Date (RDD) block the system understands that the high
priority is assigned only to penetrate protected inventory
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levels. Expedited shipment for this requirement is not
necessary. The "modified UMMIPS procedures" allow the
supplying activity to make that determination. [Ref. l:p. 2-
11]
3. Reducing the Navy Transportation Bill
It is understood that the modified UMMIP system is
vulnerable to abuse by customers and these shortcomings are
addressed by the Air Challenge Program. The Air Challenge
Program is designed to screen shipments in order to eliminate
unauthorized commodities and items that exceed aircraft
capacities. Navy policy requires reviewing all CONUS moves
over 150 pounds and all out-CONUS moves regardless of the
weight. Three fourths of air eligible shipments challenged
are downgraded to surface shipment for an annual savings of
over $175 million. [Ref. 4:p. 2.4]
Another method in which the Navy is reducing its total
transportation bill is through Supply Management Inspections.
An example is the requirement that the Commander Naval Surface
Forces Atlantic Fleet (CNSL) has imposed by limiting the
amount of issue group 1 and 2 requisitions to 50% of the total
requisitions initiated by an activity.
4. DLA Two Tier Pricing System
Colonel Bill Endres USAF at DLA headquarters is
currently proposing a drastic change to the way we in the
military determine and account for transportation of DLA
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managed material. Colonel Endres' idea is that we completely
separate the transportation decision from UMMIPS and in its
place utilize two levels of service. The standard level of
service will provide delivery of the requisitioned material
IN-CONUS within twenty one days and the premium level of
service will provide delivery within thirty six hours. Though
still in the planning stages, Colonel Endres states that the
standard price will include a surcharge of 2.5% of the item's
value while the premium price will have a surcharge of about
20% of the item's value. Current DLA managed material carries
a flat 2.5% surcharge that covers both first and second
destination shipping charges. [Ref. 7]
When interviewed, Colonel Endres cited Donald
Shycoff's idea of unit costing as the basis for his proposal.
He further went on to say that for his idea to work each
activity would have to be assigned a transportation budget.
5. Discussion of two tier pricing proposal
The two tier pricing system as discussed by Colonel
Bill Endres contains several economic inefficiencies. For
example, basing the surcharge on the value of the material
being shipped is inefficient. By failing to adequately
address the driver in the shipping equation, namely physical
characteristics of the shipment (usually weight, distance, and
commodity type), little if anything is gained in the way of
efficiency. Under this proposed system, the transportation
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budgets each requisitioner will control will be ineffectively
expended since customers will be more willing to incur premium
transportation costs on low value requisitions. Basing -he
surcharge on the material value under these circumstances
could yield disastrous results for Navy transportation budgets
since it would cost significantly more to ship a ton of sand
than a personal computer. A shipment cost determination
method similar to the type utilized by mail order catalog
merchants, such as J.C. Whitney, would yield significantly
more efficient shipment charges. In this method, the merchant
employs a matrix that the customer utilizes to estimate the
shipment charges. By considering both size and distance, the
merchant can easily offer many levels of shipment service from
which the customer can select.
B. RESPONSES TO DLA TWO TIER PRICING PROPOSAL
The two tier pricing system is a hotly debated topic
between the Navy and the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA). DLA
is moving forward with Mr. Shycoff's idea that all activities
within DOD will soon be utilizing the unit costing method. As
stated previously, the currently popular notion of unit
costing as a method of measuring efficiency is flawed
according to many economists. Unfortunately the opinion of
many economists has little effect on government policy in
light of the political pressure DOD is experiencing during the
current downsizing.
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During this thesis research, several transportation
experts throughout the DOD transportation system were
surveyed. All were familiar with the economic inconsistencies
of unit costing and the two tier system. Commander Dave
Courter at NAVSUP agrees with DLA that the customer is the
source of excessive transportation costs but disagrees that
the answer lies in allocating transportation budgets to cost
centers. As a Naval Officer, he understands that a ship's
schedule and tempo of operations drives the demand for
material, and for that reason the allocation of transportation
budgets to ships would be difficult, if not impossible, to
manage as recommended by DLA. He suggests maintaining the
budget at a type commander or higher level to dampen the
impact any individual ship might generate. He understands
that this alteration of the DLA plar effectively disarms the
mechanism that would force the cost center to carefully
scrutinize their transportation expenses, but sees no other
way to manage a transportation budget. [Ref. 91
Captain D. Munroe, the Commanding Officer at the Navy
Material Transportation Office, has a different objection to
the DLA proposal. He sees limiting service to only two levels
as iacreasing transportation expenditures. In support of his
view he suggests that the less-than-thirty-six-hours and less-
than-twenty-one-days delivery time frames provide insufficient
options for the Navy. He predicts that DLA's proposal will
actually result increase the Navy's demand for premium
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transportation. He defends the modified UMMIP system and
cites its responsiveness to customer demands. He agrees that
there is some abuse of UMMIPS but is confident that the
majority of poor transportation decisions are caught by the
stringent Navy air challenge thresholds [Ref. 10]. When asked
about the viability of cost centers maintaining their own
transportation budgets, he agreed with the NAVSUP opinion that
the tempo of operations is what drives demand fcr material.
It would be very difficult to effectively fund activities
without impacting readiness.
Captain Rorex, N4, is the Navy sponsor for DMRD 915 and
likes the idea of forcing the requiring activity to consider
transportation costs when ordering material. However, he
disagrees with the method that DLA chooses to allocate costs.
He sees the allocation of transportation costs based on a
percentage of value as incorrect. His idea is to implement
the two tier system but to more accurately reflect the actual
transportation cost in the price. This method requires a much
more sophisticated pricing model but would fairly result in
the activity considering actual transportation costs.
Utilizing Captain Rorex's suggestions, the allocation of
transportation dollars would not be as critical since the
entire pricing system would be reevaluated. The current 2.5%
of the value assigned to all DOD parts would become obsolete
and each part would more accurately reflect the total cost
incurred by DOD for transportation. As Captain Rorex
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observed, assessing a surcharge for transportation based on
value will have activities considering costs, but
unfortunately the wrong ones. If the goal is to reduce
transportation costs, any surcharge must be based on the
actual or projected cost to transport material. Additional
savings would be gained since administrative transportation
overview policies such as the Air Challenge Program and
auditing would no longer be required [Ref. 1i].
C. CONCLUSION
Unit costing is viewed by many in DOD as a way in which
the government can ensure the most efficient use of limited
funds. As discussed, many doubt that unit costing is founded
upon solid economic principals or that it can be applied to a
non-profit organization.
The two tier pricing program that DLA is proposing is
cited as a move towards unit costing. In actuality, it is
only a modification of the current UMIPS system with a few
variations. The decision to base the transportation surcharge
on a percentage of value has no foundation, just as in the
current UMMIP system. DLA's assertion that there is excessive
demand for premium transportation since the requisition does
not bear the cost is accurate. By shifting the cost of
transportation to the requisitioner they will more
thoughtfully consider the financial impact of premium
transportation. Unfortunately, the value of the material has
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no link to the transportation costs, so the cost center would
consider the wrong factors during the transportation decision.
Considering these facts, DLA's two tier pricing system has
little if anything in common with unit costing except that the
cost center would hold a transportation budget and pay all
transportation costs incurred.
Another factor that the two tier pricing system fails to
address is the disproportionate factor by which AMC is
supported by transportation funding. AMC's mission is
readiness through flying hours. A disproportionate amount of
funding for this command is generated via it's cargo handling
activities. Rates on AMC missions have in the past exceeded
those on the open market. When these facts are considered, it
becomes clear that unit costing is not an appropriate method
by which to control spiraling transportation costs.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND CAPACITY OF ORGANIC AIRLIFT
A. BACKGROUND
This discussion explores the state of organic military
airlift demand and how it is affected by various DOD policies.
Also included is a critique of a study conducted by the
Logistics Management Institute in which they analyzed the 1989
Air Mobility Command's (AMC) practical experiment to extend
cargo holding times. Finally, the chapter concludes by
assessing the recommendations reached by the AMC and LMI.
The AMC's primary mission is to develop and maintain an
Air Force capable of performing airlift support in the event
of national emergency. As a consequence of training, AMC has
evolved into the primary provider of air cargo transportation
for the military during peacetime. Though not its primary
mission, using AMC as the mover of choice for military cargo
provides significant revenues to defray its training costs.
AMC ships cargo with both AMC organic aircraft and
contracted airlift services from the private sector. These
contracted services are conducted under Civilian Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) agreements. CRAF contractors receive guaranteed
quantities of freight during peacetime in return for providing
predetermined levels of support in the event of a national
emergency.
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Through the mid 1980's, AMC enjoyed success in generating
revenue through their air cargo business, but recent defense
cuts have significantly reduced cargo shipments. By 1987,
declining transportation budgets reduced the cargo moved by
AMC by 30%. During the same period, AMC's aircraft capacity
remained relatively constant, resulting in sharply lower
aircraft utilization rates. [Ref. ll:p. iii]
AMC planners have compensated for these shrinking cargo
levels by diverting CRAF cargo to AMC organic flights.
Although diverting this cargo has effectively corrected the
funding shortfall, congressmen who represent the CRAF
contractors and their employees are applying increasing
pressure to prevent any further diversions. If this
congressional pressure continues, the Air Force will have
little choice but to augment the AMC DBOF/T subaccount with
money from other Air Force sources [Ref. 12].
Until the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Air Force
can determine the future AMC mission and the aircraft required
to support it, they must be willing to continue current levels
of financial support. That support might come by increasing
either training appropriations or reimbursement levels for JCS
exercises. In any case, a coordinated effort in the area of
strategic planning is in AMC's best long term interest.
In an effort to increase sagging aircraft capacity
utilization rates, AMC experimented with extending the length
of time it holds cargo at the air port of embarkation (APOE).
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During this experiment, AMC increased the overall APOE holding
time from a historical average of 48 hours to 55 hours. This
raised aircraft capacity utilization rates by 3%. The Air
Force controlled the impact of this experiment on other areas
of the UMMIPS time line by reducing the intransit time and
processing time at the air port of debarkation (APOD). The
linking factor in this hypothesis is the assumption that the
amount of cargo shipped organically by AMC can be increased.
This additional cargo is to be generated by diverting a larger
portion of CRAF-designated cargo to organic flights.
The Air Force has attempted several additional actions to
increase aircraft capacity utilization. Among the more
productive actions were canceling the proposed expansion of
the CRAF program and implementing scheduled service between
heavily utilized freight shipment points.
The May 1990 UMMIPS revision that required all
requisitions to include an RDD or equivalent entry made this
experiment possible. Prior to this change, there was no way
to ascertain the required delivery date for all requisitions.
Under the current system, the determining factor for making
transportation decisions is the assigned issue group priority.
The requirement to make an RDD entry allows the supply system
to separate inventory issue decisions from transportation
decisions. [Ref. 11:p. 2-5]
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1. Reduced Airlift Demand
The reduced airlift demand that developed from the
declining transportation budgets appears as an overcapacity nf
AMC aircraft. This excess aircraft tonnage must be considered
when analyzing the aircraft utilization question. Figure 4-1
graphically represents the interrelationships between cargo
holding time, level of cargo movement and the aggregate
capacity of AMC aircraft. The isoquants are utilized to
illustrate two levels of cargo movement with level two being
larger than level one. Figure 4-1 has no quantitative value;
its sole purpose is to demonstrate the trade offs between the
three variables. If aircraft capacity is held constant at ACa
(rather than being reduced to ACb) and cargo holding time is
increased from "a" to "c", organic cargo increases from level
one to level two. [Ref. l1:p. 1-2]
The Air Force does not necessarily see the current
aircraft tonnage of AMC as being critical to its effective
operation but rather views it as the least manipulable of the
three components in Figure 4-1. AMC planners see the
remaining variables, namely increased cargo holding time and
increased organic cargo, as having the most potential for
reconciling operating funds and expenditures.
2. UM3IPS Time Frames
The Air Force's proposal to reallocate the days
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Figure 4-1 Critical Components Of AMC Operations
4-1 shows the current system along with DOD and Air Force
proposals. Recognizing the drastic improvement in the
requisition processing times made possible through automation,
DOD decided that it was unrealistic to designate two days for
requisition submission/passing action. At the same time, Air
Force representatives were trying to solicit support for
additional time during the AMC possession period (segments 6
to 8 in Table 4-1). As a result of these two ideas, the
proposed DOD breakdown is currently being considered. Since
the time that the above proposal was submitted for
consideration, the Air Force has decided that assigning
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TABLE 4-1 UMMIPS TIME STANDARDS FOR TP-l EUROPEAN
SHIPMENTS
Pipeline segment Current DOD Air
Force
2. Requisition submission 1
1 1
2. Passing Action 1
3. Inventory control point 1 1 1
availability
determination
4. Depot/storage site 1
4 4
5. CONUS intransit 3
6. APOE processing 2
7. Intransit overseas 1
4 4
8. APOD processing 1
9. Intratheatre intransit 1 1
10. Receipt by 1 1 1
requisitioner
Total order-ship time 12 12 12
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense
specific time periods to each segment would limit the effect
of increased cargo holding time. As a result, the Air Force
has submitted its own version for consideration that provides
the same four days to the AMC possession period but without
the restrictions in the DOD plan.
The only difference between the DOD and Air Force
proposals is that the Air Force version removes the fixed time
limits imposed on AMC managers during the AMC possession
period (segments 6 to 8). AMC suggests that by eliminating
the artificial time limits during their possession period,
APOE times could be extended, paving the way for increased
aircraft capacity utilization. [Ref. 11:p. 1-41
43
B. EFFECT OF CARGO HOLDING ON AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION
The Air Force contracted with the Logistic Management
Institute (LMI) in Washington DC to develop a statistical
model to assess the validity of the results of their 1989
cargo holding experiment. In developing of their model, LMI
reasoned that the benefit of cargo holding time extensions
would only occur if additional cargo could be generated
assuming aircraft capacity is fixed. Although the LMI model
seems to make intuitive sense, the report fails to provide
sufficient data to allow an unqualified validation. In
particular, it is difficult to link the model to the
experiment because the model holds the volume of cargo
movement constant while the experiment was designed to shift
cargo from CRAF to AMC.
Equation 1 is the LMI-developed mathematical
representation of the discussed relationship. Equation 1 is
expressed in linear form and shows that cargo movement (CM) is
a function of aircraft capacity (AC), cargo holding time (CH),
and transportation budgets (TB). The coefficients for both
aircraft capacity, b, and cargo holding time, c, should be
positive, signifying that increases in either would increase
the amount of cargo moved. Declining transportation budgets
should have a depressing effect on cargo moved, resulting in
a negative e coefficient. [Ref. l1:p. 2-21
CM=a+b*AC+c*CH+e*TB [Eq 11
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From Equation 1, LMI represented the quantitative tradeoff
between aircraft capacity and cargo-holding time when moving
a fixed amount of cargo. Differentiating Equation 1 yields
Equation 2. [Ref. ll:p. 2-2]
d(CM)=bd(AC)+cd(CH)+ed(TB) [Eq 2]
To determine the tradeoff between capacity and holding
time, LMI chose to hold cargo movement constant and the
transportation budget constant. This was achieved by
mathematically setting d(TB) and d(CM) equal to zero, and
solving for the tradeoff between aircraft capacity and cargo-
holding time, as shown in Equation 3. [Ref. l1:p. 2-2]
d(CH)/d(AC)=-b/c [Eq 3]
LMI estimated that AMC would meet a given level of cargo
movement by reducing aircraft capacity and increasing cargo
holding times according to the ratio -b/c. [Ref. 1-. :p. A-2]
LMI's model shows that for every 15 percent increase in
world-wide APOE cargo holding time, AMC would increase
aircraft capacity utilization by about 3 percent. Table 4-2
displays the linearly projected increases in cargo holding
time based on the LMI model. Interestingly, these gains in
aircraft utilization are consistent with those that AMC
experienced when they conducted their practical experiment.
[Ref. 1l:p. 2-2]
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1. LKI Assessment of Delivery Quality
LMI conducted a survey to determine the impact of the
FY89 AMC experiment on customer service. The questionnaire,
included in an Appendix, was forwarded to the following
commands:
"* Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet
"* Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
"• Pacific Air Forces
"* U.S. Air Forces Europe
"• U.S. Army Forces Europe
The instructions accompanying this survey were to
distribute it to 5% of each command's activities. Of the
responses returned, the majority stated that less than 2W of
AMC shipments were late. Although the results of this survey
seem to support LMI's findings, the less than scientific
methodology is questionable. Expecting a customer to review
material receipts that are up to a year old to determine if
TABLE 4-2 EFFECT OF CARGO-HOLDING TIME ON AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION
CARGO-HOLDING PERCENT CHANGE AIRCRAFT






Source: Logistics Management Institute
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AMC was responsible for its late delivery based on the RDD is
unreasonable. Operating forces have no way of determining
what segment of the supply system was responsible for the
lateness of a shipment. Additionally, an RDD was not a
mandatory entry on requisitions until May of 1990, making
analysis of other than "expeditious" requirements impossible.
With regard to material that requires expeditious shipment,
the entry "999" only denotes that the material requires the
fastest possible shipping mode. The requisitioner is unable
to make any type of judgement as to the effectiveness of the
AMC system based on when the required 999 part is received.
The survey was designed as if the respondents were aware of
the cargo holding time experiment and were documenting their
experiences as they occurred. It is optimistic on the part of
LMI to assume that the respondents thoroughly investigated
their historical records when responding to this five question
survey.
2. LXI Conclusions
The LMI study concludes with the following
recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics) ASD (P&L):
* The ASD (P&L) should issue a policy memorandum directing
AMC to place greater emphasis on meeting RDDs and
authorizing expanded flexibility and responsibility for
managing its portion of the logistics pipeline.
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"* The ASD (P&L) should issue a policy memorandum authorizing
AMC additional time in the logistic pipeline, separate
from that of the intratheatre managers. The additional
time should come from the requisition submission/passing
time segment of the UMIPS pipeline as in the pending DOD
proposal.
"* The ASD (P&L) and AMC should develop a reporting mechanism
to monitor AMC's performance based on a combination of
measures including shipment receipt dates, RDDs and UMMIPS
time frames.
"* AMC in conjunction with the ASD (P&L) should undertake a
comprehensive review of wartime and peacetime airlift
requirements to reconcile both strategic and efficiency
concerns.
Of these recommendations, the reconciliation of
strategic and efficiency concerns seems to be paramount. As
cargo revenues continue to decline, AMC training budgets will
be required to support increasingly higher portions of the AMC
budget. To solve this dilemma, LMI and AMC are proposing to
modify both UMMIPS and the associated measures of
effectiveness. Although these changes can provide AMC with
substantial latitude in scheduling efficiency, the
overcapacity of organic aircraft in peacetime is still a major
problem.
LMI's suggestion to alter the UMMIP system to
facilitate extending cargo holding time will not solve AMC's
long term problems. Currently, supply system customers give
little thought to the assignment of an RDD when submitting a
requisition. If, as AMC suggests, a new emphasis is placed on
the RDD, customers will more carefully consider their true
requirements. When it becomes apparent that the RDD estimate
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will determine if a requirement receives air shipment or not,
customers will begin to routinely assign an appropriate RDD.
The assertion that removing all RDD shipments from the
scrutiny of UMMIPS will enable AMC to more effectively manage
urgent 999 shipments is speculation. First, it assumes that
removing RDD assigned shipments from the scrutiny of UMMIPS
will make critical space available on otherwise filled planes.
Overfilled AMC organic flights are not the problem. The
problem is the difficultly that AMC is having meeting the
UMMIPS timeframes for 999 shipments. Second, although
managing shipments by the RDD (when applicable) will allow
additional cargo holding time, the urgent 999 shipments will
continue to drive the aircraft schedule. Providing AMC an
extra day in the UMMIPS timeframe to manage 999 shipments may
help in improving the current 82% on-time rate, but it does
little to address the core problems of overcapacity and
underfunding.
To adequately address the capacity and funding issues
requires reviewing DOD's current strategic plans. The
required size of the AMC fleet must first be determined by the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Air
Force. There has been no such review conducted since the
demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction of
forward deployed troops in Europe and the Far East. The
subsequent reduction in cargo requiring air shipment has both
idled AMC aircraft and reduced the delicate balance of funds
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inflows and outflows from the AMC DBOF/T subaccount. Over the
years, AMC has become increasingly dependent on the revenues
generated by the air cargo transport business.
3. Analysis of LMI Conclusions
By pursuing the problem from an AMC fleet
underutilization point of view, LMI fails to address the real
issue: excessive aircraft capacity. Another problem with
LMI's study occurs with their review of and concurrence with
AMC's assessment of customer support during AMC's practical
experiment. Their agreement with AMC that customers
experienced little or no decline in service during the AMC
1989 experiment is presumptuous. The survey design and
sampling techniques resulted in a questionable conclusion.
In their final recommendations to the Air Force and
OSD, LMI suggests a realigning of AMC aircraft capacity to
reflect revised requirements. LMI's failure to consider
eliminating fleet assets and increasing dependence on the CRAF
to simplify future business fluctuations is parochial.
Overlooking this obvious logical alternative makes LMI's
recommendations dubious. Eliminating excess aircraft capacity
must be considered in any discussion of potential solutions.
On its own merits, managing AMC cargo by customer-
established RDDs has great potential. Often issue group (IG)
one and two requisitions are assigned such designations only
to penetrate inventory levels. Providing transportation
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priority based on inventory access requirements is improper.
Transportation mode decisions based on the customer-provided
RDDs are a logical procedural improvement.
Similarly, it is also logical to continue to manage
999 shipments under UMMIPS. An RDD of 999 denotes no specific
RDD, only that the part is urgently required. The associated
reporting criteria for both RDD entries of specific dates and
999 should be implemented as appropriate.
Providing AMC an additional day within the UMMIP
system (obtained from the requisition submission/passing time)
is appropriate. Vast improvements in the requisition referral
system have reduced the time required for submission and
passing action to less than an hour in most cases.
The problems of aircraft underutilization and
insufficient AMC budgets have been exacerbated since AMC and
LMI considered this problem in 1990. The ability to extend
cargo hold time and to divert cargo from CRAF to organic
flights has been fully exploited. AMC is being forced to
spread AMC's fixed costs over fewer and fewer shipments.
Relief from this situation can only be achieved by either
reducing the number of aircraft assigned to AMC or by
implementing a systematic layup of selected aircraft.
[Ref. 131
By reducing the number of aircraft, AMC can
effectively increase aircraft utilization by extending cargo
holding time with the current levels of cargo. Any additional
51
decreases to transportation budgets will require further
reductions of AMC force assets and increases to cargo holding




In review, this thesis addressed many of the current
concerns of military planners with regard to transportation
issues being faced during the current DOD downsizing.
Chapter II discussed a proactive president issuing the DMR
that called for specific levels of savings within DOD. These
specific savings goals were assigned to individual areas of
responsibility throughout the department. Responsibility
centers then responded with DMRDs that identified where
improvements would occur. The DMRDs that pertained to
transportation savings were then examined in detail. In-depth
analysis of these transportation related DMRfDs was then
conducted to establish a knowledge base for comparing and
contrasting the competing initiatives. The analysis concluded
by discussing the major areas of concern with regard to cost
savings within the DOD transportation system.
Chapter III attacked the issue of unit costing and the DLA
two tier pricing proposal. First, the underlying economic
principles of unit costing were presented. This analysis
showed that the acting DOD Comptroller considered the wrong
costs. Second, the current U•MIP system and the proposed two
tier pricing program were compared in detail. Finally,
various DOD policy makers were surveyed to determine the
acceptability of the DLA proposal across the various services.
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The economic inconsistencies of the DLA two tier pricing
program were summarized along with its associated
shortcomings. The primary problem was the lack of a
realistic link between the actual shipping costs and the
charge the customer is assessed.
Chapter IV examined the costs and capacities of organic
airlift. It opened with a review of the problems that
complicate AMC's strategic airlift mission. The relationships
between cargo holding time, available aircraft capacity, and
cargo movement levels were examined to determine what options
are available to AMC planners in their efforts to reconcile
funding shortfalls in the DBOF/T account. If AMC's main
mission is providing assets and personnel for emergency
mobility, this has to be provided regardless of cargo shipped.
To a large extent the capital and personnel are fixed costs.
Marginal costs only involve expenses over what is necessary
for training. Next, a report that was conducted by LMI for the
Air Force was critiqued to assist the reader in evaluating the
foundation on which AMC bases its argument for changes in the
UMMIP system and cargo holding times. Included in that report
is a mathematical model which was offered as supporting
validation for the AMC practical experiment results. Although
this model makes intuitive sense, the LMI report doesn't
include sufficient data to allow an independent assessment.
In conclusion, the lack of emphasis placed on reducing the
number of aircraft in the AMC is inappropriate. The analysis
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does not prove the potential for system-wide savings for a
number of the policy initiatives. Specifically, if AMC's
main mission is providing assets and personnel for emergency
mobility, this has to be provided regardless of cargo being
shipped. To a large extent, the capital and personnel are
fixed costs. Marginal costs only involve expenses over what
is necessary for training. If we use Shycoff's unit costing
theory which requires 100% cost recovery we will charge much
more than the marginal cost of shipping. This could
inappropriately shift shipments from air transport, where
marginal costs are low, to other modes where marginal costs,
but not average total costs, are higher.
On the positive side there are potential cost savings from
managing shipments by the RDD and providing an additional day




S•l11'M, FN'"''Ir I iI. NFI.SS QUF5WT1(NNAIRF
This appendiz prteqnte the enmplete questinnneire that wAs *ont to several
major comemnde soliciting thir experience with the qftmlity and timeliness of
Military Airlift Command (MAC) deliveries during FYA8 and rY89.
INSTRUCTION
Your unit has been selected to assist the L-gistics Man ar•ement Instltute (LMI),
Bethesda. Maryland, In an auessment of MAC's experimentation with Its shipping.
possession Utmes. Emperimentally, MAC has Increased its serial port ,fembarkation
eargo-holding times to enhance alrcraft utiUllation, while it decreasod other posse.
ain time6 mindful of your delivery requirements.
The central question Is: flow. if at all. have your delivery times bq.an affeeted by
such changes in procedure? The attached, brief questionnaire Is designed to answer
that question.
If you need any clarifleston or further Informntion about the qesdeomsalra,
feel free to contact lArry Schwart,, LMI - 301.320-7276. Please FAX your cm
pltted quesetionnalre to LMI. 301-320.8617. by (various detsel.
Thank you, In advance, for your cooperation.
QUISTIONNAIRE
1. Indicate your ptimary receiving area ror MAC airlift shipments, and your




* Unit and Autavon
(Asmaer the re~aaiaing questions with respect to MAC airlift f'jr your primary
2. Whet pervesetag of your FYSS-FY8W shipments did not rropt your requirod
dellve.7 time,? Fltease cheek the bez that most aceuratey reflects yaour
law t~a IPereet late
4gae.-lspervantlate
13 eresst- 10P*oast late
13 It wtans-so Percent late
(If 70 WWsweie IeM than I Ve es tv* you bave complettd the questionauire.
O0uwM12, usmue eaweriag tOe queeismaalre.)
11.- In w"ie iAnd mis did you eypeu'Iseos the meet delays? Frleass theck the
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4. Specify eix Traiieportation Control Numbers (TCN*) that represmot particularly4
late shipmenats between March 1966 and October 1989.
b.I
S. Piwulde a case hietory for two of the TCNs selected In answer to queothm 4. You
may Provide a handwritten 0epae Pleas Include the following In pwr
a. Shipment category, e.g., carg, personal property. securitysseglsatne
b. Required delivery data (if specdfied)
a. Numbereofda yeor hour, late
L. Reasm. for lateness, e.g.. MAC delay, not In stock. or late shidpmet bi
dePvL
(Yen have completed the questionnaire.)
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